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1. INTRODUCTION
In January 2011, China launched a property tax trial in two cities,
Chongqing and Shanghai, in the hope of controlling skyrocketing housing
prices and stabilizing local governments' scal revenue. However, there is
little existing public nance analysis on land-related scal policies to guide
either the development or implementation of these types of policies. This
paper examines scal land policy in China through the lens of theories and
practices on good governance.
What constitutes good governance or government? In an Aristotelian
spirit we may say that a good government is one which excels in fullling
its proper functions. Views of government functions may vary but most of
us would agree that the government has at the very least two functions:
facilitation of economic life and maintenance of peace and order; to be
able to fulll these functions the government must be able to sustain itself.
Land administration is implicated in the exercise of all these functions:
land is one of the key factors of production along with labor and capital;
failure to manage land properly has historically led to popular uprisings
and erosion of legitimacy of governments; and land provides with revenue
directly through land taxation or serves as the basis (via the notion of
residence) for claims to other revenue sources (e.g. personal income tax).
The art of good governance consists in balancing the exercise of these
functions, yet tensions and con
icts may appear as one function interferes
with another. It is in this context that we consider governance over land.
For the Chinese economy which has been expanding at roughly 10 percent
annually over the last quarter century, growth no longer seizes the central
stage of policy agenda. The focus has been shifted towards sustainability
and quality of growth in the medium to long run. Therefore, government's
control over land must enable socially sustainable forms of growth. In Chi-
na, government | especially the sub-national tiers | plays a crucial role in
ensuring socially sustainable development and provision of public services
(health care, education, and social protection), infrastructure and agricul-
tural development. However, the revenue bases of local governments are
very limited, and they depend heavily on land-related revenues. Thus, in-
adequate land administration can be potentially economically costly; it can
undermine the scal capacity of the state. At the same time governments
scal policies which have promoted enclosures and land expropriations in-
cur substantial political costs as well.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two considers government's use of
land as a source of revenue. We identify a number of aspects of the current
land revenue system which carry high economic and/or political costs. Sec-
tion three emphasizes the recent upward trend in land-related unrest as a
result of abuses by local governments which originate | at least in part |LAND TAXATION IN CHINA 499
from certain uses of land as a source of government revenue. Land-related
unrest signals erosion of legitimacy of the government. Further, we point
out that government's scal policies related to land hinder the development
of property rights by undermining government's credibility and paralyzing
the political will of the people. Our special concern is with the institution
of collective property which is slowly emerging from the shadow of the for-
mer state property in the course of transition. Collective property right
can be a useful legal and economic institution but must receive political
support to exist alongside with private property. Section four concludes.
2. LAND AS A SOURCE OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE
Since 1956, the rural land has been property of the collective, while the
urban land has belonged to the state.1 The state maintains monopoly of
the primary land market in the urban areas; the state transfers use rights
to a plot of land via two tracks-allocation (reserved for state-owned or non-
prot) and conveyance (reserved for commercial enterprises). The land-use
rights obtained through conveyance can be further transferred which has
permitted the secondary land market to emerge. Needless to say, the fees
on conveyance are much higher than fees on allocation.
In the rural areas, while the collectives formally have property rights and
certain degree of autonomy in decisions with regard to land, the state im-
poses controls on certain transfer of rural land use rights, especially if they
involve conversion to non-agricultural use.2 Weak collectives' and individ-
ual farmers' rights have made it relatively easy for the local governments to
exercise discretion over the use of land, its conversion to non-agricultural
use or expropriation.
Local governments' monopoly on land decision-making makes it an es-
pecially attractive revenue source for the local governments to meet their
extensive expenditure assignments. The 1994 tax reform recentralized the
revenue assignments, leaving expenditure assignments largely untouched,
creating a substantial scal gap at local levels. In 2008, sub-national gov-
ernments accounted for more than 78.68 percent of total public expen-
diture, while receiving 46.71 percent of total government revenue (China
Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Spending on social services is even more de-
centralized all the way down to the county level, with the sub-provincial
tier nancing 70 percent of public investment in social services, provin-
cial and central tiers contributing another 20 and 10 percent respectively
1This distinction between state-owned urban and collective-owned rural is simplied.
In reality, according to the 1996 land survey report, the state owned six percent of cul-
tivated land and orchards (yuandi) and 55 percent of forest and pasture land. Pastures
and forests account for 97 percent of the state-owned agricultural land.
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in 2005(Shen forthcoming; Shen and Zou forthcoming). Central govern-
ment transfers are sizable; they nanced 67 percent of provincial, 57 per-
cent of prefecture and 66 percent country and lower level expenditures in
2003 (Shah and Shen 2008)3, yet inadequate to ll the vertical scal gap.
Over-reliance on transfers carries the risk of soft budgetary constraints and
creates perverse incentives to collect taxes, further deepening reliance on
transfers and extra-budgetary revenue. In China, local governments do not
have the right to set the tax rate except some minor local taxes. Especially,
the \tax sharing reform" in 1994 was designed to base the scal relations
between governments on the tax code, which recentralized the Chinese s-
cal system because the central government takes a considerable amount of
revenue (Wang, Shen and Zou, 2009, P208).
Lack of revenue seriously compromises local governments' ability to carry
out infrastructure investment and weakens social service provision. Both
are highly visible public services and the failure to invest in either may lead
to political repercussion. Thus local governments are faced with strong
incentives and in reality provided with the opportunity to exploit land as
a source of revenue. The revenues from land recorded in the formal budget
are small partly due to loopholes in the tax code. For instance, there is
virtually no property tax in China. And most of the budgetary income
from land comes in the form of one-o charges on transactions or are based
on statutorily xed, cost-based assessments which fail to take into account
the current market value of the land. Thus, budget fails to provide sound
value-based tax revenue as practiced in most other countries.
During the 1990s the share of land and property taxes in all sub-national
taxes averaged for 40 percent for developing countries, 35 percent for devel-
oped countries and only 12 percent for transition countries (Bird and Slack,
2004). As a share of sub-national revenue, property and land taxes amoun-
t to 18 percent in developed countries and 19 percent in developing ones;
in transition countries land and property taxation contributes less than 9
percent of sub-national revenue (Bahl, 2001). As gure 1 illustrates, the
contribution of property taxes to sub-national revenue in China is small
even by comparison with transition countries, only 4.9 percent. The land
and property taxation in sub-national expenditure is about 10 percent in
developed and developing countries and slightly over 5 percent in transition
countries (Deininger, 2003).
Unfavorable revenue-sharing arrangements and weakness of budgetary
revenue base have led local governments to expand collection of extra-
budgetary revenue. Extra-budgetary revenue from land is substantially
greater in magnitude; by some estimates, land transfer fees amount to at
3Shah and Shen (2008) consider central-provincial shared taxes as central transfers
according to the international standards.LAND TAXATION IN CHINA 501
FIG. 1. Reliance on Property Taxes by Local Governments (Property Tax as a
Percent of Total Local Revenues)
!
Source: Authors, based on data from Bird and Slack (2004)
least 20 to 30 percent of total sub-national government revenue (World
Bank, 2006). Unfortunately extra-budgetary funds lack stability and have
uncertain legal status. Additionally, the collection and administration of
extra-budgetary funds is more opaque and contributes to corruption and
makes it more dicult to detect unsound scal practices.
Local governments generate revenue from land transfers in a variety of
ways: (a) directly through land auctions4; (b) through the administrative
transfer of land for urban use, in which case the benets of transfer are
indirect: land transfers for urban construction seek to attract industrial
enterprises whose presence in turn gives local budget a boost; (c) through
land banks and mortgage loans.
In 2007, land transfer revenue accounts for 15% of the total central and
sub-national government revenue. The tax revenue accounted for only 56%
of total Chinese government revenue, followed by the social security in-
come (13%), extra-budgetary revenue (9%) and budgetary non-tax revenue
(7%). For local governments, land transfer revenue has had an even higher
share of the total revenue. Figure 3 show the trend of the land transfers
revenue and land transfer price in China from 1999 and 2007. The gure
depicts that land transfer has been increasing dramatically since 1999. The
land transfer total sale price increased from 241.68 billion RMB in 2002 to
1221.67 billion RMB in 2007, and the land transfer local government rev-
enue has also experienced signicant raise to 454.14 billion RMB in 2007.
In addition, gure 4 depicts that land related revenue take an increasing
proportion of local governments' total revenue, for example, land related
revenue accounted for less than 10% of central and local government rev-
4Auctions account for 20 to 30 percent of all land transfers.502 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
FIG. 2. Chinese Government Revenue Structure in 2007
!
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2008, China Labor Statistical Year-
book 2008, Yearbook of Land and Resources of China 2008, and Peking
University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Pol-
icy.
FIG. 3. Trend of Land Transfer in China
!
Source: China Statistical Yearbook of Land and Resources of China 2000-
2008, and Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Develop-
ment and Land Policy.
enue before 2000, and dramatically increased to 20% of local government
revenue and 12% of central and local government revenue in 2007. Ad-
ditionally, table 1 break the land transfer revenue by province. Sichuan
province ranked the highest in terms of the land transfer revenue as a ratioLAND TAXATION IN CHINA 503
FIG. 4. Land Revenue as a Share of Total Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure 1999-
2007
!
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1999-2008, and Peking University-
Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy.
of GDP (5.4%), land transfer revenue as a share of total revenue (66.66%),
and land transfer revenue as a share of total expenditure (32.24%).
Land banking has evolved into a vehicle of capitalization on requisi-
tioned land-an undertaking driven entirely by prot-making. Originally
land banking was intended as a planning tool for productive development
of surplus land. Today land banking facilitates land transfers which have
nothing to do with planning but allocated land for suboptimal uses. Land
banks hold the land for the local governments, mortgage it with loan in-
stitutions and invest recovered funds in urban infrastructure development.
Land banking in China is characterized by high volume of transactions,
which is virtually unprecedented in the world.
Using of requisitioned land as collateral on mortgage loans has signif-
icant implications for local government nance. On one hand, mortgage
loans alleviate the decit of funds for infrastructure investment; howev-
er the benets from such investments are unevenly distributed. Because
mortgage loans carry the risk of expropriation of the mortgaged land in
case of local governments' default, local governments have to invest the
funds in prot-maximizing ways, which in most cases results in investment
in urban infrastructure where the returns on investment are greater. Rural
areas in dire need of infrastructure investment are unlikely to benet from
such loans. The same problem confounded the subsidized loan program
which failed to induce the desired poverty-reducing eect because budget-
constrained local governments tended to allocate subsidized loan funds to
capital-intensive industries in search for faster and higher returns.
On the other hand, access to credit softens budgetary constraints and
potentially undermines scal discipline, especially in the environment lack504 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
TABLE 1.
Land Revenue Statistics by Province in China in 2007
Rank Province Land Transfer Province Land Transfer Province Land Transfer
Revenue as a Revenue as a Revenue as a
ratio of GDP Share of Total Share of Total
(%) Revenue (%) Expenditure (%)
1 Sichuan 5.40 Sichuan 66.66 Sichuan 32.24
2 Chongqing 4.31 Chongqing 40.18 Tianjin 29.67
3 Tianjin 3.96 Anhui 38.40 Fujian 28.15
4 Hainan 3.24 Tianjin 37.02 Chongqing 23.15
5 Liaoning 3.00 Fujian 36.65 Shandong 21.57
6 Anhui 2.84 Hainan 36.61 Zhejiang 18.88
7 Fujian 2.77 Liaoning 30.58 Liaoning 18.76
8 Shandong 1.88 Shandong 29.12 Anhui 16.79
9 Zhejiang 1.82 Hubei 26.85 Hainan 16.17
10 Hubei 1.72 Hebei 25.29 Hebei 13.25
11 Ningxia 1.60 Jilin 22.19 Hubei 12.41
12 Xinjiang 1.52 Zhejiang 20.68 Jiangsu 10.81
13 Hebei 1.46 Guangxi 19.22 Henan 8.18
14 Guangxi 1.35 Xinjiang 18.67 Guangxi 8.16
15 Jilin 1.35 Ningxia 17.77 Jilin 8.05
16 Guizhou 1.32 Henan 17.75 Guangdong 7.21
17 Jiangsu 1.07 Heilongjiang 16.63 Hunan 6.86
18 Inner Mongolia 1.04 Hunan 15.36 Xinjiang 6.71
19 Heilongjiang 1.04 Inner Mongolia 12.85 Heilongjiang 6.17
20 Henan 1.02 Guizhou 12.72 Ningxia 5.88
21 Hunan 1.01 Jiangsu 12.33 Inner Mongolia 5.84
22 Shaanxi 1.01 Shaanxi 11.62 Shaanxi 5.24
23 Shanghai 0.94 Shanxi 8.34 Shanghai 5.23
24 Shanxi 0.87 Guangdong 8.17 Shanxi 4.75
25 Guangdong 0.73 Jiangxi 7.51 Guizhou 4.56
26 Jiangxi 0.53 Tibet 6.43 Jiangxi 3.24
27 Yunnan 0.45 Shanghai 5.50 Yunnan 1.9
28 Tibet 0.38 Yunnan 4.43 Gansu 1.24
29 Gansu 0.31 Gansu 4.40 Beijing 1.1
30 Beijing 0.19 Qinghai 2.39 Qinghai 0.48
31 Qinghai 0.17 Beijing 1.21 Tibet 0.47
Source: Yearbook of Land and Resources of China 2008, China Statistical Yearbook 2008 and Peking University-Lincoln
Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy.
of supervision over mortgage loans. Mortgage loans also lack rm legal s-
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borrowing, which introduces additional risk in mortgage loans. In practice,
there is no evidence of risky nancial behavior by the local governments
(such as defaults on the loans) mainly due to government's access to con-
siderable supply of land at relatively low price and China's phenomenal
economic performance. Potential sources of risk do exist, including (i) in-
ability of the local governments to determine the nal demand for land
and (ii) local governments' exposure to interest rate 
uctuations which can
potentially cause volatility of local government's income; (iii) shrinkage of
the supply of convertible land, which means that these practices are un-
sustainable even in the medium term (rapid pace of conversion of arable
land has threatened food security and some provinces have exhausted their
quotas of convertible land5).
Thus current uses of land to generate revenue are inecient from a num-
ber of perspectives. The revenues generated from land mostly do not go
through the formal channel of budget. Once we count the direct and in-
direct revenue generated through administrative transfer, auctions, and
other fees that are land-based (in a broad sense), revenue base may be
substantial. However, such revenue sourcing is unstable, non-transparent,
and risky. It tends to undervalue land in eort to realize a quick prot,
encourages a fast rate of conversion of arable land, and rewards corrupt
ocials and gives them incentives to appropriate communal lands.
LAND TAX ADMNISTRATION
A comprehensive tax reform may help to address many of these chal-
lenges, through replacing non-transparent, unreliable and unsustainable
fee-based revenue with a transparent and coherent tax.
Eective administration of land taxation requires a cadastre with size,
value and ownership status of each parcel of land and its productive capaci-
ty, as well as information on the costs of inputs and outputs. China does not
have a cadastre which leads to problems of identication and assessment
of properties; these diculties can be compounded by poor enforcement of
tax payments6.
Land taxes can be based on area occupied, appraised value of property
or self-assessed property value. The value may refer to the land alone or to
land, improvements to land and buildings. Tax on land value (excluding
5Exhaustion of convertible land may not be a problem in principle; instead xed
supply of convertible land can be an incentive to more intensive use of available land
and its further development. The danger, however, is that weak institutions and legal
code and poor enforcement ability, would allow further extensive urban development and
conversion of land to urban use instead of promoting intensive growth. It is important
to structure incentives in ways which are conducive to intensive growth in the industrial
centers. Similarly intensive agricultural production should be stimulated as well.
6Property tax administration is weakened by incomplete property registers in Guinea
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improvements) would be less distortionary and approximate a benet tax.
Taxation of land value | excluding buildings and improvements | has
the merit, at least in theory, of stimulating more productive use of the
land. Additionally, in the case of China where the real-estate market has
been growing extremely fast, value-based taxes would signicantly improve
revenue recovery.
Area based taxation can be distortionary since it makes no adjustment
for land quality and eectively imposes higher rates on low-quality land.
Land value taxation is preferable but is costly to implement and requires
adequate capacity for regular appraisals. Self-assessment is a low-cost al-
ternative to formal value assessment and may be particularly attractive
to low-income countries with weak administrative capacity. However its
success hinges on being able to adequately structure incentives to promote
adequate reporting of land value; and perception that self-evaluations are
fair is also crucial to the success of self-assessments. For these reasons
self-evaluations are not commonly used.
It is widely accepted that advantages of land taxation come at high ad-
ministrative cost. The cost increases tremendously if proper value-based
taxation is to be implemented due to the requirement of up-to-date infor-
mation about properties. However the experience of Russia's land taxation
indicates that in China's circumstances a tax reform is feasible and desir-
able. Russia embarked on the land taxation reform in the midst of serious
economic downturn, lacking a cadastre of lands and having no experience in
ad valorem tax assessment (Nitikin and Zou, 2006). China is much better
positioned economically to undertake the reform.
In case of China, as in Russia, a gradual approach could be used when
rst cadastral assessment of land is performed. The second stage involves
registration and valuation of buildings. In the absence of land markets,
actual market value-based assessment can be reasonably well substituted
by statistical mass-assessment techniques.
Implementation of land value taxation almost immediately increased lo-
cal revenues (since 2005, in Russia 100 percent of land tax is assigned to
municipal budgets), despite the fact that property taxes are criticized for
their lack of elasticity and inability to increase revenue from taxes on prop-
erty quickly or by a substantial margin (Bird 2000). In Ontario, reformed
property taxation did not bring a windfall of revenue, but has been able to
increase revenue substantially to make up for the shortage of intergovern-
mental transfers (Nitikin and Zou, 2006).
There is a substantial degree of subjectivity in property assessments. Val-
uations are likely to re
ect political pressures or capture of administration
by private interests. In countries where taxpayers have little condence
in the impartiality of assessments, valuation will likely generate con
ic-
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human and organizational capacity to conduct assessments, local govern-
ments should have appropriate organizational structures to deal with ap-
peals. Russia's tax reform has been associated with signicant increase in
the total number of disputes; in 2000-2005 the number of disputes quadru-
pled (Nitikin and Zou, 2006).
Currently China's courts are overwhelmed with appeals for redress of
grievances against government ocials and denitely will be unable to ar-
biter disputes related to appraisals. Local governments in India in fact have
moved away from value-based taxation for the concern of social cohesion
and the burden on local arbitration institutions. Assessments of land based
on physical characteristics of the plot | on the other hand | anchor land
taxation to more objective and easily observable and measurable attributes
and allow to make adjustment | albeit very imperfect | for the quality of
land. In Canada, improved valuation of properties has led to a drop in the
number of disputed tax charges. Slack (2002) attributes it to taxpayers'
condence in the fairness of assessments.
Land value taxation may be opposed by the asset rich but income-poor
or credit-constrained taxpayers since they cannot increase the productiv-
ity of their land due to credit constraints. By the same token, the rich,
whom the tax most aects (in absolute terms) are also likely to object or
to evade the tax. A similar tax once introduced in Cracow was quickly re-
bued by the legislators who faced serious political pressure from the elites
aected by the tax and who incidentally were aected by the land value
taxation themselves (Brzeski, 2005). Given the widespread frustration with
local corruption among the peasants, it would be dangerous to risk further
increasing the collusion of local elites and ocials.
Even in more auent settings | such as Canada | political pressures
to adjust the level of property taxes down or not to initiate the reform alto-
gether are substantial. In Ontario, preparation of the tax reform spanned
several terms of administrations, before it could actually be implemented.
This requires substantial political will. Once the reform has been initiated
the same political pressure is likely to introduce new distortions.
Bird (2000) argues that decentralization can improve collection. This
may work in China as well but enforcement of collection must be preceded
by reforms of taxation in such ways that local governments have an in-
centive to collect taxes. Currently, in the absence either of solid local tax
bases or the autonomy to set tax rates, the costs of enforcing collection are
high relative to the benets from it as a result of inadequate composition of
local governments' tax bases. Land/property taxation rates should be set
above the cost-recovery threshold|the same problem faced Russia's local
government with respect to individual property tax collection before 1999,
when individual property was taxed at the low 0.1 percent rate.508 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
High visibility of property taxes increases the political costs of property
taxation.7 These taxes are normally charged annually and require lump
sum payments which make tax payers more aware of their property taxes.
Since the tax base on property taxes is inelastic, to increase revenue from
property, the governments must raise the tax rate, also a very visible pa-
rameter. Visibility of the property taxation could be used for the purpose
of accountability and transparency of local governments. And precisely for
this reason they encounter political resistance from elites and local ocials.
Additionally, since property tax is so closely connected with the incidence
of benets, taxpayers resent property taxes if they observe that the local
governments fail to deliver public services (poor road maintenance or trash
removal services, or poor access to health and education facilities). This
gives another reason why land taxes should remain in municipal budgets.
3. FISCAL LAND POLICY IN CHINA: EROSION OF
LEGITIMACY AND GOVERNANCE
3.1. Erosion of legitimacy
Financing a government may involve substantial political risks. Political
calculus has special importance for China. Political turmoil is a frequent
companion of transition. In China, social unrest has increased from 10,000
protests in 1994 involving 730,000 participants to 74000 protests involving
3.7 million. During the nineties, incidence of protests rose dramatically by
60 percent from 1997 to 1998 and by 30 percent from 1998 and 1999. After
a slowdown, a new cycle of growth in unrest began in 2004 (see gure 5).
Secular upward trend in social unrest notwithstanding, changes in the
level of unrest are precipitated by government policies. The 1997-1998
rise in protests occurred as a result of SOE downsizing8. The latest wave
of unrests is to a great extent fueled by land-related issues: (1) land ex-
propriations for public development projects, (2) enclosures of farmland
without adequate compensation for the losses for urban development, and
(3) corruption and unfair land reallocations by village administrations, (4)
coercion of farmers to relocate through the use of violence. For exam-
ple, in October of 2004, 90,000 peasants in Sichuan province confronted
the police over the expropriation of their land without due compensation
to enable the construction of a hydroelectric dam (Marquand, 2004 and
Mooney 2004). Increase in land-related protests roughly coincides with a
new wave of growth of capital investments and increased demand for land.9
7Bird (2000) observes that \academics tend to be much fonder of the property tax
than the politicians who have to impose it."
8Thirty million workers lost jobs in 1997-1999.
9Gross xed capital formation expanded by 19.7 percent in 2003.LAND TAXATION IN CHINA 509





























Source: Liaowang and China Ministry of Public Security, cited in Tanner
(2004), State Department (2005), Chan 2004, Pei (2005). Note: Number
of protests refers to \mass incidents".
Most of the unrests have origin in grievances against mistreatment by lo-
cal ocials. There is an overwhelming perception of corruption and abuse
of authority by local ocials among peasants. The issue of enclosures has
provoked steep increase in the levels of social unrest in terms of number of
events and number of participants. Peasants protest against coercive mean-
s some local ocial employ to induce farmers to sell their land. In 2005,
30 protesters were killed by the police in Dongzhou village in Guangdong.
In Dingzhou village, Hebei province, protests ensued after the local gov-
ernment used hundreds of thugs to force peasants from their land to make
way for a power plant; confrontation with police resulted in six deaths and
many more wounded (AFP, Februrary 28, 2006).
Grievances are so numerous that the overloaded system of petitioning re-
dress of abuse by local ocials cannot process them. Only two out of 1000
petitions nd some sort of resolution through intervention of the higher
ocials. The court system10 is also overloaded with case of abuse of au-
10The RLCL modied the procedure for resolution of dispute related to land. The
1998 Land Management Law and Administrative Review Law required that all disputes
sought resolutions through the administrative reviews, and only passed to the people's510 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
thority by local ocials; courts take no more than 90,000 such cases a year
and rule against the government in 1=4 of these cases (Pei, 2005a).
Social unrest is a frequent outcome of land reforms and without promp-
t resolution, political tensions surrounding the land issues can spill into
mass violent con
icts or civil war. Tensions around land issues preceded,
for instance, the outbreak of a civil war in Rwanda and underpin ethnic
confrontation in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana.
Creation of institutions which can diuse tensions in a timely fashion
before they escalate into a violent con
ict is crucial. Rolfes and Mohrman
(2000) document a positive eect of legal aid centers in Vladimir and Sama-
ra oblast in Russia in resolving contentious land-related issues. In Mexico
the government launched a large-scale program on provision of legal aid
to farmers, which involved establishment of 42 agrarian courts (Zepeda,
2000).
Provision of written land use contracts to individual farmers in China is
a step in the direction of prompt resolution of disputes related to ownership
right. Introduction of elections of village leaders represents an importan-
t political safe guard against corruption in village administrations. The
success if this initiative has been limited however.
But apart from corruption, the failure to resolve land disputes is also
associated with poor titling, fragmentation of forest administration across
several agencies, and ambiguous legal relationship between collective and s-
tate property. We see evidence of these problems in relation to forest tenure.
For instance, in 1997 nearly 18 percent of state-owned forest area and 21
percent of collective forest area was unregistered nationwide.11 Several of-
ces participate in forest administration: the State Bureau of Forestry, the
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Land Resources, and the Ministry
of Civil Aairs (Ho, forthcoming).
Even when the methods are legal, the level of compensation is frequent-
ly unfair, which undermines credibility of local governments. Article 65 of
the 1998 Land Management Law calls for \appropriate compensation" to
the land users whose land was expropriated for the construction of public
facilities or public welfare undertakings. Unfortunately \appropriate com-
pensation" is a vague standard and the law provides no guidance for its
interpretation. There is a tendency for most collective entities to inter-
pret \appropriate compensation" as a very minimal amount (Prosterman,
1998).
court as a last resort. The RLCL gave farmers a choice of ways for pursuing dispute
resolution, including consultation, deviation, arbitration and law suits in people's court.
11There is sizable variation across provinces. For example, in Inner Mongolia which
has the largest forest area in the country (over 12 percent of all forest area) and where
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3.2. Property rights and non-credible governance
Local governments' appetite for land has created political tensions in the
countryside between local ocials and the peasants who face frequent dis-
possessions in the name of \public good;" increase instances of social unrest
indicate erosion of people's condence in government. Popular condence
in the government is an integral component of tenure security. Even when
one is granted formal property rights, one must be condent that these
rights will be enforced equitably. In Russia for instance, one of the reasons
for slow rental market is precisely such lack of condence: property own-
ers | despite having a written title to the property | are in many cases
uncertain whether their property rights will be upheld.
While the collective may claim customary use right, in the formal legal
sense the forest is state owned unless collective ownership can be legally
proven. Such burden of proof may be too much for the collective for a
number of reasons. The denition of the collective is ambiguous: is it
the township, the administrative village or the natural village or villagers'
group? Second, the collective's claim to ownership of the forest land is
based on customary use since before the current state was established (prior
to 1949); however China's legislature invalidates all land titles issued prior
to the land reform of 1949. This eectively leads to the situation when in
practice the ownership right of the collective is in fact a right to manage
and administer the use of land, while the ultimate owner is the state.12 The
weak legal status of collectives' claim to ownership of land relative to the
state's similar claims makes it dicult for the village to resist reclamations
and enclosures: once the county or township government decides to convert
the land to non-agricultural use, the collective has no legal recourse (Ho,
forthcoming). From the juridical point of view, reclamation constitutes the
transfer of the collective's use right to the state, thus aligning the use right
with the property ownership right.
Another instance when the weakness of the current collective ownership
rights becomes obvious is conversion of arable land to non-agricultural use.
If collective property right existed as an institution independent from the
state, would not one expect that that collective ownership of rural land
would interfere with arable land conversion? Yet it does not, which points
to the weakness of collective ownership right. It would be more accurate to
say that in practice the collective land rights consist of a bundle of rights
to use and administer the land resources on behalf of the real owner, the
state. The problem of conversion then is not caused by the failure of the
12The state then \may in accordance with the law, expropriate land which is under
collective ownership, if it is in the public interest" (Land Administration Law (1988,
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collective ownership as such but rather by the invasiveness of the state
which undermines the autonomy of the collective.
If invasiveness of the state ownership is the problem, dismantling of col-
lective ownership and institution of private ownership in its place misses
the point. The state can invade and subvert private property rights as well
(in Turkmenistan private property is recognized by the Constitution13 and
all the formal attributes of private property right to land are present, e.g.
well documented land titles).
When it comes to collective property rights, the importance of condence
in the government is even greater. China is at an important juncture when
it has to decide whether collective property ownership should exist. In our
opinion it should, but in a modied form. Yet collective property is a del-
icate form of property since it involves cooperation of many parties. As
such it requires protection from the government. Unfortunately, current
land policy contributes to the destruction of the popular support for col-
lective property, thus undermining a powerful source of socially sustainable
growth.
International evidence suggests that collective land ownership and equi-
table access to land it provides is conducive to growth. Equitable access
to land is associated with higher growth and as well as higher return-
s accumulation of human capital (Deininger and Olinto, 2000). Indeed
we see that distribution of land in China is among most equitable in the
world. Research points to the importance of initial equality for growth and
China's experience is consistent with this generalization. Elimination of
collective property is likely to increase inequality in land distribution and
can be potentially damaging to long-term growth. We have seen that in-
come/consumption inequality in China has been increasing and has slowed
down the pace of poverty reduction. Privatization of land in the absence
of collective property will further exacerbate this trend.
Additionally Pei (2005b) argues that in China during the 1990s, collective
ownership of land combined with HRS created an institutional framework
which allowed more uniform labor-intensive industrialization of the coun-
tryside through TVEs, absorbed surplus labor14 and raised local welfare
levels minimizing the threat of social turmoil fundamental restructuring of
factor markets could bring. During the late 1990s and 2000s, the role of
TVEs in growth has declined and the private sector has assumed the lead-
ership role in development, however the contribution of collective property
13Article 9 of Turkmenistan's Constitution states: \Turkmenistan establishes the
rights of private ownership over the means of production, land, and other material
and intellectual goods."
14Approximately 110 million rural surplus workers moved from farming to rural in-
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ownership with improved incentives structures and greater tenure security
should not be discounted.
The reason why collective ownership promoted equitable land distribu-
tion is a system of frequent land readjustments | one of the unique features
of China's land administration, by comparison with other countries. Ap-
proximately 3=4 of all changes in land holdings are related to village-wide
reallocations15 (Rozelle et al., 2005). Reallocation consists in redistribution
of responsibility land from one household to another; for instance, land can
be shifted towards a household which had a newborn son, and away from
a household who married their daughter. Reallocation takes place without
compensation to the previous tenants for any investments they have made.
It has been argued that the possibility of reallocation and other restric-
tions on land use create disincentives to invest in the land. However, Kung
and Liu (1997) and Carter et al. (1995) report that villagers favor land
reallocation. If so, and if reallocation implies lack of tenure security, then
either villagers oppose tenure security, or in fact reallocation and tenure
security are not mutually exclusive notions from the point of view of the
farmers.
Deininger and Jin (2002) argue precisely that: they show that increased
transferability | even without transfer of ownership right | of land will
signicantly improve the alignment of land resources with households' farm-
ing ability. Transferability of the land would also increase the land supply
by allowing households with low aptitude for farming to move to non-
farming activities, in turn reducing rental prices and thus facilitating the
access to land by able but poor farmers.
Yet at the same time Deininger and Jin (2002) nd that current adminis-
trative reallocation practices do promote productivity as well, even though
there is scope for improvement through better matching of land supply to
households' demand. It is likely that reallocation and transfer contribute
to productivity via dierent mechanisms: the former by preventing exces-
sive concentration of land and the latter by inducing more ecient land
allocation.
A wise strategy would consist in trying to pursue the advantages of
private property rights as well the advantages of the collective property
rights, especially since peasant seem to appreciate the equalizing eect of
land reallocations.16 Such a route would entail: (a) continued separation
of property rights and land use rights for some of the land; this land ;
(b) preservation and strengthening of collective ownership and/or land use
rights; (c) strengthening of tenure security and transferability of tenure
15Rozelle's data describe the period prior to the 2002 Rural Land Contracting Law.
16Ho (forthcoming) argues for a dual tenure system | private and communal | for
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either through private property rights or surrogates17; (d) further lifting
restrictions on the kinds of productive agricultural land use, (e) devolution
of decision-making power regarding land readjustment to the collective,
along the line of the 2002 RLCL which calls for approval of land reallocation
decisions by the supermajority introduced in the village assembly.
The principle of periodical adjustments of land distribution is the essence
of collective ownership. While the practice of land readjustment should be
continued it must be reformed. It must involve fair compensation which
takes into account the improvements made to the land by the tenant as well
as the inconvenience of changes due to land assignment. The compensation
mechanism will improve tenure security and stimulate investment in the
responsibility land. Land reassignments must also become more targeted
and less sweeping in magnitude, applying to a smaller share of agricultural
land to create room for a land rental market.
Unfortunately, the current of governance practices, especially those of
local governments undermine collective property ownership. Lack of ac-
countability of township ocials and village leadership undermine peas-
ants' trust in fairness of reallocation decisions. Current practices of unfair
compensation have a similar eect.
At the same time legislation is indispensable, which would establish the
collective ownership right, one that is independent of state ownership.
4. CONCLUSION
Our discussion has focused on the role of land in government nancing
and its economic and political cost, as well as the erosion of government's
credibility and its negative impact on private and collective property rights.
There are obvious deciencies in the administration and design of the land
taxation. First, budgetary revenue from the land is small, re
ecting the
fact that property taxation is virtually non-existent in China. Second, tax
autonomy of local governments is limited and local revenue bases cannot
support the assigned level of expenditures which has led to the proliferation
of EBFs; the latter provide large contributions to sub-national coers, but
lack stability. Third, state monopoly on the primary market in urban land
and control over rural land has made it easy for local governments to raise
revenue through conversion of agricultural land to industrial to nance the
vertical scal gap.
A number of modications to the land taxation have been considered.
Land value taxation has denite advantages on theoretical grounds since
it approximates benets tax and can induce development. However inter-
national experience indicates that land value taxation is costly in terms of
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organizational capacity (to make property valuation possible and to sup-
port processing of disputes related to assessment); furthermore, it would
more likely increase political tensions in the countryside. Bird (2000: 14)
explicitly states that \experience around the world shows that the politi-
cal costs of reliance on the property taxes are so high that no government
[motivated by purely cost-benet considerations] with access to cheaper'
sources of nance will willingly do so."
However, judging from Russia's experience, implementation of land tax-
ation in China is feasible and can be expected to pass even more smoothly
than in Russia, where the reform was conducted in adverse economic cir-
cumstances. If a gradual approach is taken, the cost of creation of property
registry, assessment, etc. will be manageable.
A comprehensive land tax reform has the potential to address many of
the distortions produced by the current forms of land revenue-generating.
Current forms are unstable, non-transparent, and risky; they tends to un-
dervalue the land in an eort to realize a quick prot, encourage a fast rate
of conversion of arable land, and reward corrupt ocials and give them
incentives to appropriate communal lands.
Furthermore, land conversions and unjust expropriations undermine the
institutions of private and|even more so|collective rights by causing ero-
sion of popular trust in the government. The latter are still emerging as a
separate form of ownership independent of state ownership and rely heavily
on credibility of governments. Collective rights are particularly vulnerable
to erosion of credibility. Meanwhile, collective land ownership promotes
more equitable asset distribution and thus contributes to faster and more
socially sustainable growth.
Thus, in the long run improved land taxation in properly implemented
can foster credibility and promote the institutions of private and public
property. Nevertheless, in the short run, land taxation reform itself carries
the risk of wakening the credibility of government. Land value reform
is known to arouse political tensions, even in more auent economies.
A margin of credibility has proved important even in course of Ontario's
modernization of its land taxation system. Moreover, in China there is
strong evidence that haphazard land management practices have eroded
public trust as seen in the increase of grievances and protests.
Considering political and social tensions surrounding land in China, it is
recommended that rst, implementation of the land value taxation should
be gradual, introducing land value taxation rst and then moving to valu-
ating buildings; second, that it runs parallel to a profound reform of local
governance to boost government credibility; and third, that additional more

exible revenue bases (e.g. PIT or EIT) are desirable for local nancing.18
18See Bird (2000) and World Bank (2002) for a review of alternatives.516 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
APPENDIX A
The rural land tenure system
Five modalities of tenure of agricultural land can be identied: respon-
sibility land, ration land, private plots, contract land, and reclaimed land.
Responsibility land tenure is | the most common type reported by 90
percent of villages and covering 80 percent of all farmland | is allocated
to households by the village in exchange for a mandatory quota of agricul-
tural output at below-market prices. Responsibility land is allocated based
on the household size and the number of working age household members.
It is subject to reallocation to other households by the village administra-
tion. Ration land is allocated to households on the basis of their size to
ensure households' self-sucient grain production; tenure of ration land
is not subject to any fees or other obligations. Private plots are mainly
parcels of land in farmers' backyards; households' tenure of these plots is
practically secure in the long and short term and in some localities the pri-
vate plots can be bequeathed to children; however farmers cannot transfer
title to these plots to other households. Private plots are the second most
common type of land tenure practiced in 54 percent of villages. Contract
land is rented out to farmers by the villages for a monetary fee and may or
may not be subject to a production quota. Reclaimed land is previously
uncultivated land to which farmers can acquire use rights without incurring
delivery quotas or fees (Rozelle et al., 2005).
In addition to land readjustments, crop selection and land use are strictly
regimented | quotas are demanded to be paid in grain and cannot be sub-
stituted with cash and farmers are not allowed to grow cash crops despite
the fact that they are more lucrative. All these measures serve to promote
food security and self-suciency in agricultural production.
Decisions about land reallocation are made in most cases by the village
heads, but 14.4 percent report that reallocation is decided at the township
level. Reallocation decisions are made in a decentralized way by villages
and townships, and despite a single nationwide policy about land allocation
(30 year term on land tenure prior to reallocation), there is substantial
variation across provinces, townships and villages. Slightly over 10 percent
of villages reallocate land and reallocations involve approximately 1=2 of
the village's land, aecting 2=3 of village households (Rozelle et al., 2005).
Legal Basis for the rural land tenure system
Collectivization1 in the mid 1950s and de-collectivization since the late
1970s and 1980s which precipitated the introduction of the Household Re-
1Despite initial institution of egalitarian individual ownership after the expropriation
of land from the landlords and rich peasants in 1949, during the 1950s, China collec-
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sponsibility System (HRS) are central events which shaped China's current
land tenure system. The 1982 Constitution established State ownership
over the urban land, while the rural land was recognized as the property
of the rural collective; thus dual system of land ownership was instituted.
The trend toward gradual de-collectivization continued during the eight-
ies and nineties. The 1988 constitutional amendments asserted transfer-
ability of the land use rights and the 1998 amendments to the Land Ad-
ministration Law extended the length of contracts for farmers to 30 years
and provided for written registration of the land use contracts, thus giving
farmers and important instruments of land dispute resolution.
The Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL) adopted in August of 2002
further deepened the rights of individual farmers, stating that land rights
include \rights to use, prot from, and transfer land contracting and op-
eration rights, and the right of autonomy over production operations and
disposition of products and the right to receive the corresponding compen-
sation" for the land readjustments and expropriations.2 Specically RLCL
permits the following transactions: transfer to other village households,
lease to non-village households, exchange, assignment and other transac-
tions involving land which do not contradict the law. The RLCL does not
provide guidance with regard to the right of inheritance of arable land,
while it explicitly permits inheritance of forest land. Omission of the right
to inherit arable land seeks to avoid disrupting the property structure of
household land holdings (Gu, 2002)
The RLCL secured the right of farmers to 30-year contracts and prohib-
ited land readjustments during this term and most importantly limited the
right of the collective to reallocate the land to the instances when natural
disasters severely damage the contracted land and some other special cir-
cumstances.3 The authority to dene the range of \special circumstances"
rests with the local governments; however, RLCL species that such deci-
sions should win approval of the super-majority (two-thirds) of the village
assembly or village representatives and receive clearance from the township
government and the county agricultural administration. The Law also stip-
ulates that farmers must be party to any transaction involving contracted
land and explicitly prohibits attempts to \intercept or reduce" the proceed-
s from land transaction by local ocials.4 Furthermore, RLCL validates
contracts which contain prohibition of readjustment, except in those cases
when readjustment is mandated by the law.5
The RLCL modied the procedure for resolution of dispute related to
land. The 1998 Land Management Law and Administrative Review Law
2Article 16.
3Article 27.
4Articles 34 and 35.
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required that all disputes sought resolutions through the administrative
reviews, and only passed to the people's court as a last resort. The RLCL
gave farmers a choice of ways for pursuing dispute resolution, including
consultation, deviation, arbitration and law suits in people's court6.
APPENDIX B
Land use rights, their marketability and contribution to tenure
security
International experience suggests that private property rights to land are
not necessary to create a market in land. Land use and land lease rights
are divorced from ownership rights in Botswana, yet land leases are readily
used in the real estate market and as collateral by nancial institutions1.
The leasehold rights are fully marketable and their value has appreciated
over time, making them increasingly attractive to the banks.
Collective ownership of land by land boards does not signicantly inter-
fere with transactions in land. Land boards certify leasehold rights of the
loan applicants but their permission is not required to take out a mortgage.
To be sure, land use rights in Botswana have evolved since 1968 | when
the land boards were established | the functionality of the leasehold rights
has been subjects to upgrades which allow land leases for residential lands
and extended the leasehold right to individuals outside of the community.
In Vietnam, similarly, land ownership rights are not coextensive with
land use rights; nevertheless, long-term land use rights provide adequate
security of tenure. There is a moderately active market in land use rights
with just over 15 percent of land leased out. Land sale and rental transfers
tend to be informal to avoid ocial land administration fees. Vietnam's
experience with land transfers also supports the claim that market renal
transfer tend to lead to more ecient allocation of land: overall land-leasing
households tend to be more ecient at farming.2
Three Central Asian countries | Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyr-
gyzstan | also provide valuable insight into the relation between land use
and land ownership rights. Bromley (2005) draws on the experience of these
ex-social countries to argue that private property rights are not necessary
for successful economic development or for operation of land markets. In
Uzbekistan | by far the most successful in terms of per capita growth
among the three | agriculture is dominated by collective farms which are
able to pursue economies of scale in cotton production (mainly in irriga-
tion) and remain eective agricultural producers. Private ownership of
6Articles 51 and 52.
1Information on land policy in Botswana comes from Department of Lands of the
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Environment (2002).
2Information on land tenure in Vietnam comes from EASRD (2004).LAND TAXATION IN CHINA 519
land is in fact prohibited to avoid speculation and concentration, but in-
dividual land use rights are recognized. In Turkmenistan, on the contrary,
property rights well dened and land titles well documented, but land use
and transfer are restricted. Kyrgyzstan also directly prohibits private land
ownership, yet land market is developing, albeit slowly.
The bottom line is that it is possible to develop eective use rights with-
out committing to private land ownership. Appropriately dened land use
rights can promote tenure security and support market transactions such
as rental transfer and land mortgage. Privatization of land in an ex-social
country can prove too ambitious an undertaking involving substantial so-
cial costs which can threaten social cohesion if there is not enough political
will in the government or among the popular masses as it has turned out
to be the case in Russia.
APPENDIX C
Canada's and Russia's Experiences with Land Taxation Reform:
Lessons for China
C.1. INTRODUCTION
Bearing in mind China's ongoing reform of land taxation, we look to
the experience of Canada and the Russian Federation in reforming their
systems of taxation. The two cases capture the wide range of challenges
a reformer would face. Clearly, in the grand scheme of things, Canada's
property taxation functions eectively in that it supports national and re-
gional economic development, a reasonable level of equity and social cohe-
sion. Examination of Ontario's transition to the uniform system of current
value taxation in 1998 and its outcomes gives us a sense of the modern
standards in property taxation, their advantages and disadvantages when
their functioning is unencumbered by the institutional upheaval so typi-
cal of economies in transition. Here we look to Canada's experience with
land taxation to identify \best practices." Russia's experience with (still
ongoing) land taxation reform then highlights some of the pitfalls of imple-
menting a modern system of taxation in the context of economic transition.
Notably, in the two cases (1) tax reform was associated with a recen-
tralization of scal autonomy at the provincial level in Ontario and at the
national level in Russia; (2) was introduced in an opportune political mo-
ment and has required a great deal of political will. While in Canada, the
political costs of tax reform gure prominently, in Russia reforms are com-
pounded by the economic and organizational cost of creating cadastres and
developing the institution of cadastral assessment from scratch. Ontario's
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mance and good scal discipline among the municipalities, while Russia's
tax reform have had to be mindful of the local governments' ability to
collect taxes and to nance assessments.
C.2. REFORM OF PROPERTY TAXATION IN ONTARIO,
CANADA
Land taxes1 in Canada are levied by primarily by municipal governments,
but some provincial governments levy property taxes as well. In municipali-
ties, property taxes generate revenue for municipal services and for primary
and secondary schooling (when levied by provincial governments). For in-
stance, in 2006, 19 percent of the property tax revenue collected by the
city of Kensington in Ontario was spent on education; correspondingly, 81
percent were expended on municipal needs. The main expenditure items
in the municipal budget are police (16.9 %), social services (15.3%), re
and rescue (11.8%), road maintenance and construction (8.8%) and capital
infrastructure investment (8.3%) (Kensington City Government, 2006).
Provincial governments regulate tax bases and rates in municipalities
within their jurisdiction. Thus sub-national regulatory scal autonomy is
exercised primarily at the provincial level. Municipal governments have
the authority to vary tax burdens across dierent types of properties.
Property-related revenue accounts for a signicant share of municipal
budgets, around 53 percent across all provinces in 2000. Property taxa-
tion is central to the ability of the municipal governments to meet their
expenditure responsibilities. In fact, the 5 percentage-point reduction in
the share of intergovernmental grants between 1998 and 20002 was largely
compensated by an almost equivalent increase in property taxes (Slack,
2002).
The tax base is dened as \real property," including land and improve-
ments to it. In some instances machinery and equipment are considered
improvements. Special treatment is extended to land with mineral deposit-
s, oil and gas wells, as well as public utilities servicing several jurisdictions,
pipelines and railways.
1I discuss throughout this section Ontario's land (plus improvements) value taxation
and do not mention land transfer taxes. Similarly to sales tax, land transfer taxes in
Canada are collected at the time of purchase of a property. In Ontario and British
Columbia the sales taxes are progressive, but use dierent formulas for calculating the
tax. In British Columbia, land transfers for a sum below $200,000 are taxed at 1
percent, while land sales in excess of $200,000 are taxed at 2 percent. In Ontario, a
1.5 percent tax is imposed on land transfers under $55,000, a 1 percent tax is charged
on transfers between $55,000 and $250,000, while a 1.5 and 2 percent tax rates are
applied, respectively, to land transfers $250,000-$400,000 and in excess of $400,000 in
value.
2Grants declined from 23 to 18 percent of total municipal revenue, while property tax
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Land and properties are assessed at the market value; the value of farm-
land and managed forests is established for current land use. An eort
is being made to link to the assessed value of the property to the actual
conditions of the property market, while avoiding excessive 
uctuations. In
Ontario, for instance, in 2001 the assessed \current" value was estimated
with a two-year-lag; in 2005 the lag was reduced to 1 year3; in 2006, how-
ever, the current assessed value is calculated as a rolling average for the
previous three years.
Public hospitals and educational institutions, churches, charities, ceme-
teries and Indian land are exempted from taxes. Lands and properties
occupied by government institutions (federal and provincial) are not sub-
ject to taxation, but pay fees at a discounted rate.
Dierent rates apply to residential and non-residential properties. With-
in non-residential properties several types are further distinguished, based
on use.4 The province of Ontario, for instance, establishes separate rates for
ve types of non-residential properties: commercial, industrial, pipelines,
farms, and managed forests.
To meet dierential expenditure responsibilities, municipalities can vary
tax rates by manipulating transition ratios. 5 However the autonomy of
the municipal governments is limited | a municipality is free to increase
transition ratios up or down for only within a given range, \the range of
fairness." Yet when transition ratios exceed the upper bound of the range
of fairness, municipal governments cannot further increase the transition
ratio, but can only keep it at the existing level or decrease it, converging
toward the range of fairness.6 For instance, Ontario's 2006 transition ratio
for industrial properties is 2.5, which is well beyond the range of fairness
(0.6-1.1); consequently municipalities in Ontario can either maintain this
ratio (2.5) in 2007 or decrease it (See Table 1).
In Ontario, the range of fairness for multi-residential properties is be-
tween 1.0 and 1.1, while for most non-residential property classes7, transi-
tion ratios were allowed to vary from 0.6 to 1.1 (Slack, 2002).
A favorable rate applies to farmland at 25 percent of the residential rate
(transition ratio 0.25).
In Ontario, reduced rates apply to vacant commercial properties (35
percent below the rate of developed commercial properties), while vacant
3I.e. the market value as of June 30, 2004.
4Multi-residential properties are further distinguished.
5Transition ratios anchor the tax rate for each property class to the tax rate on
residential properties (transition ratio is equal to 1 if it is equivalent to the residential
property tax rate).
6Existing municipal rates for some property classes may exceed the range of fairness
for historical reasons.
7The notable exceptions are professional sports facilities and pipelines, for which the
ranges of transition ratio were, correspondingly, 0.001 to 1.1 and 0.6 to 0.7 (Slack, 2002).522 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
TABLE 1.
Transition Ratios, Revenue-neutral by Class.
2005 Revenue 2006
Matched General Neutral Revenue Starting
Year-end Tax 2006 Neutral Tax
Property Class 2005 CVA 2006 CVA Rates Rates Ratios Ratios
1. Residential $1,000,000 $1,100,000 0.80% 0.73% 1 1
2. Multi-residential $500,000 $550,000 1.00% 0.91% 1.247357 1.25
3. New multi-residential $0 $0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0
4. Commercial (vacancy-adjusted total) $835,000 $835,000 1.60% 1.60% 2.195349 2
5. Industrial (vacancy-adjusted total) $501,300 $451,170 2.00% 2.22% 3.049096 2.5
6. Pipeline $10,000 $10,200 0.60% 0.59% 0.807114 0.75
7. Farm $200,000 $210,000 0.20% 0.18% 0.25 0.25
8. Managed Forest $100,000 $110,000 0.20% 0.18% 0.25 0.25
Total $3,162,000 $3,282,000
Source: Government of Ontario (2006)
industrial land receives a 30 percent reduction. Agricultural land pending
development is taxed at a reduced rate. The tax increases on such land are
introduced in stages: when the land is registered for subdivision and when
a building permit has been issued.
Tax relief takes a number of forms. Tax deferral schemes are available to
the seniors, widowed or disabled, in which case a portion of the land tax is
converted into a lien on the property payable when the title is transferred.
Property tax credits are available to homeowners and renters. The amount
property tax refund is calculated as a dierence between the amount of
property taxes and some fraction of the taxpayer's income, to the eect
that higher income taxpayers receive smaller refunds. Grants to residential
taxpayers are extended in Alberta, New Brunswick, Manitoba and British
Columbia. The grants and/or subsidies are paid directly to the taxpayer to
reduce the payable property taxes. Tax deferrals as well as grants/subsidies
are administered by either provincial or municipal governments and are
funded from the corresponding budgets; while property tax refunds are
administered by provincial governments.
Billing and collection of property taxes are administered by municipal
governments. Municipalities collect and remit to the learning board bud-
gets education taxes of a quarterly basis.
Property assessment is coordinated at the provincial level. Provincial
governments established independent assessment bodies, such as BC As-
sessment in British Columbia or the Municipal Property Assessment Cor-
poration (MPAC) in Ontario. MPAC is a non-prot organization, its gov-
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nicipal and provincial representatives. Every municipality in Ontario holds
membership in MPAC. The list of MPAC's responsibilities includes: as-
sessment of value of properties, classication of properties, identication
of tax-exempt properties, compilation of the annual assessment roll to be
submitted to municipal governments, and processing of assessment appeals.
Consideration of assessment-related disputes by MPAC creates an al-
ternative channel of dispute resolution. MPAC facilitates resolution of
disputes related to assessments by providing property owners with a op-
portunity : (a) to review the assessment roll available at municipal oces;
(b) to review the details for their own property and basic assessment roll
information for as many as twelve properties using MPAC's Internet-based
service; (c) to access a MPAC's Property Prole Report showing the as-
sessment details for their property; and (d) to access comparable Property
Reports from MPAC for six comparable properties selected by the owner
and six comparables selected by MPAC. If consideration of the contested
assessments by MPAC fails to lead to a resolution, the tax payer can take
the case to the Assessment Review Board, a quasi-judicial body, or appeal
the assessment through the court. One indication of the eectiveness of
the arbitration process in Canadian provinces is the relatively low rate of
arrears which was equivalent to 7 percent of total property taxes in 1999
in Ontario (Slack, 2002).
Eight years ago Ontario's property tax system underwent a reform which
thought to correct a number of problems: (a) lack of uniform assessment
methods across municipalities, since market value taxation was introduced
on a voluntary basis, not all municipalities adopted it; (b) outdated assess-
ment system |for instance properties in Toronto had last been assessed in
1953 based on 1940 values; (b) inequitable rates and property value assess-
ment between and within municipalities, and between classes of properties;
(c) high rate of appeals of inequitable assessments. In Toronto these distor-
tions were politically motivated and designed to shift the tax burden away
from the residential taxpayers at the expense of businesses; as a result
Toronto's businesses received a substantial incentive to set up operations
elsewhere.
In response to these challenges tax policy reform in Ontario undertook
a number of steps. (1) A uniform system of assessment across municipal-
ities was introduced. (2) The provincial government required municipali-
ties to move to the single variable rate system which has been discussed
above. Prior to the reform, provincial legislature mandated higher rate of
taxation for non-residential properties.8 Prior to the reform, on average,
non-residential property rate was nearly 18 percent above the residential
8On average, non-residential property rate was nearly 18 percent above the residential
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rate; under the new system the dierence could not exceed 10 percent. (3)
The provincial government provided for tax deferral and gave provinces up
to 8 years to phase in the new regulations. (4) The legislature prohibited
subsidizing of tax increases for one class of property at the expense of other
classes (most importantly, of course, subsidization of the residential class
from the commercial or industrial classes).
Reforms led to the shifting of the tax burdens. Within the commer-
cial property class,the relative burdens on small commercial properties in-
creased by comparison with large oce properties. To dampen the eect of
this shift, the new tax legislature moved to introduce (1) optional property
classes to allow for dierential rates for subclasses of commercial proper-
ties; (2) optional caps on tax rate increases; (3) provisions that increases
in total expenditure be nanced from property taxes.
What are the consequences of this reform? Has the goal of equitable
distribution of tax burdens been achieved? And more broadly, what lessons
can we draw from Ontario's experience in land taxation?
 Within the international context, despite all the inadequacies discussed
here and which prompted the reform, Ontario's land taxation has per-
formed well in that it generated adequate revenue for the government to
nance maintenance of local infrastructure and to support provincial spend-
ing on education.
 Also, despite the fact that land revenue is considered a rather static tax
base which cannot support sudden increases in expenditure, Ontario's land
taxes made up for the reduction of government transfers to the provincial
budget fairly eectively.
 The results of the reforms have been mixed. Indeed, the reform pro-
moted greater uniformity across provinces in assessment and the structure
of property taxes. However, these reforms ran up against substantial po-
litical constraints | primarily signicant increases in the tax rates for
certain property types and increased burden on residential tax payers due
to reassessment of residential properties and limits on the increases of non-
residential property classes. Political repercussions motivated introduction
of caps which eectively led to new distortions in the distribution of tax
burdens across property classes.
 Having said this, the practice of tying the tax rate on business property
to the residential taxes in a given proportion seems like a politically savvy
practice with a lot of potential to limit the tendency of the local government
to over-tax businesses.
 Concerns with increasing assessed value of properties have led to freez-
ing of the assessed value of non-residential properties at pre-reform (1997)
level. Current value taxation is thus implemented fully only in the residen-
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 The reform recentralized | in the name of fairness | to the provincial
level the power to regulate taxes by limiting the ability of municipalities to
manipulate the distribution of tax burdens between classes of properties.
 Current value assessment also introduced a greater degree of complex-
ity in tax administration.
 Clearly the new system of assessment is largely trusted and has reduced
the number of disputed assessments.
 What insights does Ontario's experience oer for other reformer? Slack
(2006) seems to believe that the longer one waits to reform taxes, the
greater the cost of the reform will be | had Ontario introduced current
value assessment in 1978 as did British Columbia, the cost of the reform
would have likely been lower.
 This also implies that the initial period of reform is most costly polit-
ically, nancially, and possibly socially.
 Condence in the fairness of assessments is crucial to market value
taxation and investments in \getting assessment right" will pay o.
 The political will of citizens is central to the success of the reform,
especially in view of high political cost and when reforms concern such
highly visible tax.
C.3. REFORM OF LAND TAXATION IN RUSSIA
Russia is undergoing a reform of its property taxation system. There
has been a notable progress toward simplication and modernization of
property taxation. Many changes have been introduced only recently and
their eect is hard to judge, yet certain attributes of Russia's reform of the
property taxation provide relevant insights for China's ongoing reform of
land taxation.
Russia and China: Dierences and similarities in government
nance
The very fact that Russia is attempting to create a modern land and
property taxation system in the midst of transition from command economy
makes its experience relevant to China.
In Russia, expenditure assignments leave local governments responsi-
ble for social protection schemes, which should be nanced by the federal
governments to ensure proper redistribution (Martinez-Vasquez and Boex,
2001). Similarly, in China local governments are assigned a substantial
role in provision of social protection. In both countries local governments
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and land taxation in both cases is seen as the way to boost local revenue
capacity.9
Central authority in Russia and China has experienced signicant erosion
since the beginning of market reforms. In Russia, asymmetric federalism
of the early to mid 1990s was symptomatic of the weakness of the central
government. On the one hand, asymmetric arrangements served to ap-
pease secessionist movements in the regions, but on the other hand, they
weakened the federal government's scal capacity and contributed to the
federal government's default on internal debt in the wake of the 1998 cri-
sis (Martinez-Vasquez, 2002). In China local secessionist movements did
not gain the same kind of momentum they did in Russia, but the inabil-
ity of the central government to control local ocials is symptomatic of
the weakness of the central government. Notably, China and Russia both
moved to recentralize their systems of government nance after the central
and consolidated government revenues also declined substantially as a re-
sult of scal decentralization of the 1980s and early 1990s in China10 and in
the early to mid nineties in Russia. In Russia, as in China, reform of land
taxation is seen as a way of improving the eectiveness of the government
apparatus.
The two countries face a related problem of the lack of accountability of
local governments. And in Russia, as well as China, there is an expectation
that the land and property tax reform must increase transparency of local
governments' nancing and their accountability (e.g. by eliminating the
excessive reliance on extra-budgetary funds).
At a more operational level, like China, Russia has had to build its
land taxation system from ground up | there was neither a cadastre of
properties nor a capacity to perform cadastral assessment.
Unlike China's, Russia's reform of land and property taxation was ini-
tiated in unfavorable economic circumstances, including poor growth and
economic instability, but with a renewed sense of urgency | after the de-
fault of 1998 | of transforming scal relations.
Land taxation prior to 2005
Prior to January 1, 200511, the Federal Law on Payment for Land provid-
ed the legal basis for land taxation. Land tax applied to land in ownership
or use of legal entities and physical persons. Lessees of the state-owned
land (federal, regional, or municipal) were subject to land lease fees.
9Excessive \earmarking" of central government transfers in Russia and federal limits
on local revenues compounds the problem of insucient revenue sources at the local
level (Bird 2002).
10Tax Sharing System reform of 1994.
11That is prior to the adoption of Federal Law N141-FZ from November 29, 2004.LAND TAXATION IN CHINA 527
Legislatures at the corresponding levels set the rates of land lease fees
for dierent categories of lessees/owners and types of use. However, the
federal government established the minimum and maximum caps on the
tax rate, thus setting boundaries to local tax autonomy.
Dierent fee schedules were applied to agricultural and non-agricultural
lands. The tax rate doubled if the land remained unused or if it was used
for unintended purposes.
Tax rates on agricultural land vary according to the composition12 of
land, its quality, area, and location. The Federal Law on Payment for
Land set the average tax rates for each region, while the regional legislature
established the minimum rate for agricultural land. A dierent rate applied
to non-agricultural use of land by individuals in rural locations. It was a
xed rate calculated on the basis of the area of the plot. Local governments
had the discretion to increase the fee by up to 100 percent for plots under
non-agricultural use in certain locations.
Taxation rates for urban land were established by the federal Law on
Payment for Land. The rates varied by economic zone | there are eleven
of them in Russia | and ten categories of urban settlement size. These
rates represent the average tax rates mandated by the federal government
for a town of a certain size within a given economic zone; the local gov-
ernments in turn had the discretion to apply dierential rates for various
subdivisions as long as they could meet the revenue quotas corresponding
to the average rate. In calculating specic rates, local governments fac-
tored in location, distance from the center of the city or town, the level of
economic development, environmental and geological characteristics. The
tax autonomy of local governments consisted in the ability to distribute
the tax level dierently across subdivisions within their jurisdictions, while
the overall tax rate for each jurisdiction was set by the central government.
Although land tax was classied as a local tax, its revenues were never-
theless shared between the three levels of government. Tax revenues from
rural land in non-agricultural use went to local budgets. Fifty percent of
revenues from urban land went to the local budgets, 20 to regional, and
30 to central. The federal share in revenue from agricultural land was set
annually by the laws regarding the federal budget. The decision regarding
the share of federal government was informed | at least in principle |
by the administrative expenses of the federal government (management of
land use, operation of the tax-collecting service, monitoring and protec-
tion). The regional governments' share in agricultural land revenue was
determined by the regional legislature but could not exceed 10 percent.
12Dierent rates are set for dierent soil types of ploughed land, plantations, pastures,
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Land taxation system established in the Federal Law on Payment for
Land has a number of problems. (1) The tax rate structure was very com-
plex, with rates varying on the basis of economic zones, types of ownership
or lease, types of land use, settlement size, etc. (2) The revenue sharing
arrangements were also too complex and allowed the federal government a
substantial degree of discretion of the federal governments to determine its
share in the revenue on a yearly basis, which introduced uncertainty into
the budgetary process and gave the central government to expand at the
expense of the lower tiers.13 (3) The federal government appropriated a
sizable fraction of the land revenue, for instance, 30 percent or revenue from
the urban land tax went to the central budget. (4) The level of taxes was
tied to the land's physical attributes and did not correspond to its market
value, leading to signicant undervaluation of the land. (5) Although the
Law granted a degree of tax autonomy to local governments, their discre-
tion was narrowly circumscribed | they could not determine the overall
level of taxes they levied in their jurisdictions, but could distributed the
tax burden dierently across subdivisions.
Reforms after 2005
Adoption of the Federal Law on the Payment for Land in 1992 marked
the beginning of land privatization in Russia. In the absence of land mar-
kets, to enable transactions in and taxation of land, the law introduced
normative land values which varied across regions. Between 1992 and 1998
approximately 129 million hectares of land had been privatized.
The land taxation based on nominal values was confounded by hyper-
in
ation which characterized Russia's transition. Hyperin
ation required
radical and rapid adjustments of the tax values to maintain adequate lev-
els of real revenue. In some cases | mostly in urban areas | adjustments
were made on the basis of market values of land, although these markets
were very rudimentary. Non-uniform value adjustments to land value led to
sizable inequities in the distribution of taxation burden with similar prop-
erties assessed wildly dierently in dierent jurisdictions. These inequities
undermined the scal bases of many local governments and exacerbated
substantial regional inequalities of sub-national revenues. The need for a
land taxation reform became obvious, but politically challenging.
After the default of 1998, the Russian government has been gradually
reforming the revenue system, including the land taxation laws. Chapter
31 of the Tax Code of Russian Federation14 replaced the Federal Law on
Payment for Land.
13The same holds for the regional government, but to a lesser extent, since the federal
government sets a ceiling on the regional government's discretion to determine its share
of revenue.
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The new Tax Code denes the land tax as a local tax in the sense that
its revenues go to the municipal budgets. Local governments are also per-
mitted to adjust the tax rate.
Between 1999 and 2006, the Russia's Land Cadastre Service, Rosned-
vizhimost, prepared a cadastre of nearly all land using mass valuation
methods and since January 1, 2006 cadastral value of land provides the
basis for land taxation.15
Mass valuation methods were based on sale comparison, income and cost
approaches. The mass valuation of land has been dicult to implement in
a uniform fashion (geographically and across types of land) due to lack
of reliable land market data. On the one hand, only housing markets in
urban centers are adequately active enough to generate adequate market
value data; and even then sales represent a minority (approximately 6 per-
cent) of property-related transactions. On the other hand, land registration
data could not be used for assessment because the prices recorded during
registration are underreported by the contracting parties to reduce transfer
fees.
As an alternative to market value assessment, geo-referenced statistical
models linked to cadastral maps are used to predict the value of urban land.
Predictors of market land value include such factors as access to public
utilities and services, transport infrastructure, as well as environmental
factors.16 Fourteen types of urban land use | each associated with a
certain value per square meter | are distinguished for each cadastral unit
and the tax base could be calculated to re
ect its current or best use.
Rural land is assessed on the basis of its income-generating capacity,
since the agricultural land market is even less established than the urban
market.17 A large number of plots occupied by infrastructure installations,
roads, industrial sites, etc. are assessed on individual basis due to the lack
of market reference points for their valuation. This introduces a substantial
degree of subjectivity and opacity into their assessment.
According to articles 10 and 11 of the Law on the National Cadastre
of Lands, provincial governments (subjects of the federation) carry the
primary responsibility for conducting cadastral assessment of lands, while
collection of additional information regarding the land remains the respon-
sibility of local governments.
15The current estimated value of land is assessed at RUR 23600 billion, approximately
USD 790 billion (Mishustin, 2006).
16According to Mr. Overchuk, for areas where reasonably reliable market data are
available, the correlation coecients between predicted and actual market values are on
the order of .6-.7 (Overchuk, 2004).
17While private ownership of land was allowed in 1992, the sale and purchase of land
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The Tax Code signicantly simplies the tax rate schedule. It sets the
maximum rate of 0.3 percent of the cadastral value of land for agricultural
land, residential land (including land under residential construction), and
land under personal use as garden plots. For all other land, the maximum
tax rate is 1.5 percent. However, regional governments can set their own
rates within the federal limits. For instance, the city of Moscow set the
rate on the residential land at 0.1 percent. The Tax Code (article 394) pro-
vides for the possibility of introduction of dierentiated rates for dierent
categories of land and land use18. In Kazan, for examples, the municipal
government imposed taxes in the range between 0.1 and 0.4 percent of the
cadastral value of land, depending on the category of land.19 Notably the
Tax Code applies uniform rates to dierent categories of taxpayers. The
tax rate is no longer doubled for unused land.
For land in joint shared ownership, the amount of tax is calculated based
on the size of each share in terms of the land area. The tax on land in col-
lective ownership is divided equally between the members of the collective.
It is expected that the new cadastral value-based land tax will increase
the level of taxes for densely populated urban areas where the value of
land is high, while the level of taxes in smaller settlements (less than 50
thousand) will decrease.
Other property taxes
In addition to the land tax, there two more taxes on property: individu-
al property tax and enterprise property tax. Inheritance and gift tax was
recently abolished beginning in January of 2005.20 Its abolition received
wide popular support and was passed in the Parliament by a vast majority
of votes. The dissenting minority | mostly Communists | opposed the
law because elites stood to gain the most from it (RIA Novosti, 2005). The
wide-spread popular support for the abolition of the inheritance and gift
tax, however, was founded on two key considerations: on the one hand,
the assets of the elites were hidden in the o-shore accounts anyway and
they had easy access to means to avoid the inheritance and gift tax. On
the other hand, the burden of the IGT fell disproportionately on the low
-income individuals who possessed assets as a result of privatization but
18The Land Code identies several categories of land: (a) agricultural land, (b) land
under settlements, (c) lands occupied by industrial, energy, telecommunications, defense,
and security installations, (d) lands under special protection, (e) forest lands, (f) bodies
of water, and (g) the land reserve (Article 7 of the Land Code).
19Municipal government set the rate for residential land under apartment buildings at
0.1 percent and 0.2 percent rate for residential land under individual housing or garden
plots. The land occupied by commercial and industrial objects is taxed at 0.4 percent.
The land under public facilities is taxed at 0.123 percent; the land tax for city electric
transportation facilities is set at 0.1 percent (Interfax-Povolzh'e, 2005)
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who could not bequest or transfer their assets as gifts to their relatives
because of high taxes and who could not aord to avoid the tax. Moreover,
if the goal of IGT was to tap into transfer of assets by those who dispropor-
tionately proted from privatization, this tax base was incorrectly assigned
to the municipal level of government. As a local tax, IGT could be more
easily avoided by the local elites who were closely connected to the local
ocialdom than by the poor.
Although classied as regional, fty percent of the revenue from the
enterprise property tax is allocated to the local budgets at the point of
collection.
Property Owner's Options for Resolving Assessment-related Concerns.
!
Source: MPAC (2006).
Individual property tax and the enterprise property tax
Individually owned buildings and structures are subject to a tax rate of
0.1 to 2 percent of the inventory, the structure of the tax rates is progressive,
with property under RUR 300,000 taxed at 0.1%, that in 300,000-500,000
range taxed at 0.3%, and property valued over 500,000 taxed at 0.3% to
2% .21 The tax rate on the property of legal entities (organizations) set
by provincial governments, but not to exceed 2.2%. Individual property
tax revenue goes to the local budgets and the enterprise property tax is
allocated to provincial budgets (Federal Tax Service, 2005).
As with land taxes prior to the reform, there were substantial regional
disparities in the levels of taxation explained by the fact that dierent mu-
nicipalities applied their own indexes to categories of individual property to
correct for in
ation. In
ation adjustments have led to overvaluation of cer-
21The value of the inventory established either by the Bureau of Technical Inventory
(BTI) or at the mandatory insurance value. For certain vehicles (excluding automobiles)
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tain classes of property, raising their taxable value above the market price.
These adjustments particularly aected valuation of housing. Collection of
individual property taxes on housing which has not been registered during
privatization has been problematic. Much valuable new real estate escapes
taxation by remaining \unnished" and thereby unregistered by BTI. In
1999, by Tax Ministry's estimates there were over 5 million uncompleted
houses and apartments on which no taxes were assessed or paid. (Interfax
Russian News 1999, August 17).
All taxes are collected by the local branches of the tax inspectorate, the
federal tax service. The tax inspectorate then allocates exclusively local tax
revenue to the local budgets, while federal and shared tax revenue is trans-
ferred to the local oce of the federal treasury. The latter separates the
shares of dierent levels of government and transfers the funds accordingly
The way forward
The reform of land taxation has proceeded in a gradual fashion through
a series of steps on two fronts: technical and legislative. The sequencing of
the reform is informative.
On the technical front, the property taxation reform required creation of
a cadastre of properties, which in turn meant development of a new sphere
of expertise in land assessment and evaluation. In 1999-2006, Rosnedvizhi-
most created the land cadastre from scratch. Over this period, over 3500
land assessors were trained and the market for land assessment services
was legalized and the licensing of land assessors was introduced.
On the legislative front, as the land cadastre was being developed, the
government (a) moved to rationalize assignment of the land tax, making it
an exclusively local tax, thus making local revenue 
ow more predictable;
(b) simplied the land tax rate structure; (c) applied uniform rate to all
taxpayers; (d) reduced the number of property taxes by eliminating the
inheritance and gift tax.
Further reforms on the technical side will involve continued investmen-
t into the training of the land assessors is required to support periodic
re-assessment of properties; it is expected that reassessments will be con-
ducted every 3 to 5 years. The Leningrad oblast government has recently
requested a reevaluation of the land value since the market value of the
land has increased threefold since the last cadastral assessment in 2000
(Kommersant, 2006). Clearly soaring real estate prices and construction
boom in the capitals put additional pressure on the assessment agencies.
Creation of the land cadastre was conceived as the rst stage in creat-
ing the technical foundation for the land reform. The next step - on the
technical side - is creation of the cadastre of all buildings in addition to
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Once the cadastre of land and buildings is created, it will be possible
to further simplify property taxation by introducing a unied real estate
tax, which will succeed the land tax, the individual property tax, and
enterprise property tax. The intent to establish real estate taxation and
the provisional nature of the current land tax is armed in Article 65 of the
Land Code. At the moment, the implementation of the single real estate
tax has been postponed until 2008-09 due to lack of adequate cadastres in
some regions.22 The real estate tax will be classied as a regional tax but
will be shared with local governments.
The real estate tax has been piloted in two cities | Tver and Novgorod.
In Novgorod, a cadastre of all properties has been developed to enable their
appraisal. The real estate tax was introduced gradually; at the rst stage
it covered only legal entities which own the land on which they are located,
but at later stages the real estate tax will cover all the legal entities |
those which own the land and those which lease.
The experience of many countries with land value taxation indicates
that a parallel development of eective methods of dispute resolution is
necessary because of a degree of subjectivity in value assessment. Currently
land disputes are handled by the courts or arbitration courts. Aleksei
Overchuk, the deputy chief of the Federal Real Estate Cadastre Agency,
emphasized the need (a) to create organizational infrastructure to enable
eective handling of appeals of cadastral assessments (the total number of
tax-related disputes led in courts grew 400 percent and in 2000-200523,
and the trend in contested land taxes is likely to be similar), and (b) to
educate the public about cadastral assessment.
Lessons for reformers
 The sequence of reforms was reasonable: rst land cadastre was created
and land value assessment carried out, followed by the creation of real estate
cadastre. It is intended that a single real estate tax will replace the three
property taxes currently collected.
 It took the Russian cadastral agency six years to implement cadastral
assessment \from scratch." This gives Chinese reformers a reference point,
although it is not clear how quickly cadastral assessment of land in China
will take. Obviously its territory is smaller, but the number of landholdings
is much larger. On the other hand, China's good economic performance
is likely to generate resources | human and nancial - for carrying out
assessment.
 Implementation of land value taxation increased the revenue base of
the local governments and boosted local revenue.
22The lagging regions are Nizhny Novgorod, Sakhalin, Vologodsk, and Tula oblasti,
as well as in the Republic of North Osetia-Alania and the Aginsky Buryat AO.
23Federal Tax Service, http://www.nalog.ru/document.php?id=22664&topic=nal statistik.534 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
 As in Ontario, in
ation has signicantly aected property values and
resulted in \unreasonably" high tax amounts.
 The rate schedule has been considerably substantially simplied.
 Because of the small size of land markets, it was impossible to base
land value assessment on observed market rates. Mass valuation techniques
have proved a viable substitute.
 Russia is facing a number of challenges: (a) complete real estate as-
sessment, (b) continue building human capacity for assessment; (c) educate
the public regarding ad valorem taxation, (d) improve dispute-resolution
in relation to land taxation.
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